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SOLIDARITY IN HEALTHCARE 
– THE CHALLENGE OF DEMENTIA1
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Abstract. Dementia will soon be ranked as the world’s largest economy. At present, it ranges from 
the 16th to 18th place, with countries such as Indonesia, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Dementia is 
not only a financial challenge, but also a philosophical one. It provokes a paradigm shift in the 
traditional view of healthcare and expands the classic concepts of human personhood and auto-
nomy. A promising response to these challenges is the idea of cooperative solidarity. Cooperative 
solidarity, contrary to its ‘humanitarian’ version, promotes spontaneous teamwork and individual 
initiative. It obliges us not only to help 'the suffering, the troubled and the disadvantaged’, but 
above all to support those who already do so for spontaneous moral or affective reasons. In the 
field of dementia study, solidary initiatives are described within the framework of supportive care.  
Keywords: solidarity, dementia, supportive care, Ruud Ter Meuelen, David Heyd, Julian C. 
Hughes. 
1. Introduction: Dementia and the limits of health care
Dementia can be considered a ‘borderline’ case in healthcare because the 
care needed by sufferers lies on the border between home care, social care and 
healthcare, and as such forces the rigid frames of these divergent kinds of care to 
expand and become testing grounds for their work together. Dementia also ex-
poses the limits of the healthcare system in the most visible manner: its prevalence 
and gigantic costs have led traditional healthcare to the verge of insolvency, creat-
ing an urgent need for a paradigm shift in the theory of care giving, as well as 
a change in practice. New models of care and a new catalogue of good practices, 
which could emerge from this crisis, can be described as solidary.  
At first glance, this may seem controversial. How can the growing costs of 
dementia care be an argument in favour of solidarity? It can be rightly argued that 
the principle of solidarity, as the cornerstone of a welfare state, is precisely the 
same factor that renders healthcare systems insolvent. In the face of the constant 
1 The article was written as part of the “Justice in health care” research project (No. 
2013/08/A/HS1/00079), financed by the National Science Centre. 
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ageing of European society, and consequently the growing prevalence of demen-
tia, the administrative obligation to help the sickest, the poorest and most ‘needy’ 
will soon turn solidary assistance into a bottomless pit. This, however, refers only 
to the traditional, welfare-based model of solidarity. But the example of dementia 
care challenges this model. Dementia care affects not only the financial stability of 
the healthcare system, but also the traditional models of human personhood and 
healthcare, thus transforming the very concept of solidarity itself.  
This article will be divided into three parts: in the first part, I will explain 
the threefold challenge posed by the needs of dementia care to traditional health-
care – philosophical, structural, and financial. In the second part, I will present 
two models of solidarity, humanitarian and cooperative, which give rise to two 
different models of healthcare. In the third part, I will describe current theoretical 
and practical changes in dementia care, which illustrate the evolution of solidarity 
in healthcare from the welfare-based to a more cooperative model. 
2. The three challenges of dementia 
2.1. The philosophical challenge 
The challenge posed by dementia is threefold. The first and most important 
challenge is philosophical: dementia changes the traditional view of human per-
sonhood and autonomy, emphasizing their social dimensions.  
Dementia (Latin: de from, mens mind – ‘out of one’s mind’) describes 
a number of symptoms, from memory impairment and communication problems, 
changes in mood and behaviour, to the gradual loss of control of physical func-
tions. It is a complex biological condition resulting from degeneration of the nerve 
cells, and has psychological and social consequences. Deterioration of cognitive 
abilities follows progressively, and this process is often divided into three stages. 
First, there is the early (‘mild’) stage, where sufferers have memory problems, im-
paired attention, judgment and awareness, decision-making problems and mood 
swings, and sometimes aggressive episodes. A sufferer at this stage could be de-
scribed as being ‘out of herself’. In the middle (‘moderate’) stage, sufferers experi-
ence disorientation, easily become lost and expose themselves to risk, and are thus 
excluded from normal life. In the late (‘severe’) stage, sufferers lose control of bod-
ily and cognitive functions, cease to recognize their closest relatives and lose the 
ability to speak – they are then, literally, ‘out of their minds’2. 
Due to this progressive deterioration of cognitive capacities, dementia chal-
lenges the traditional concepts of identity and personhood, and therefore human 
                                                 
2 Cf. NCoB [2009] p. 4–6. 
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autonomy. The concept of personhood is based on two cognitive premises: ration-
ality and memory. Rationality is expressed by a man’s capacity for logical reason-
ing and his ability to curb his passions. The traditional model of rationality can be 
suggestively illustrated by two figures, ancient and contemporary. The ancient 
one originates from Plato: it is the widely-known figure of ‘soul as a chariot’, 
led by horsemen and two jibbers, where the horsemen, obviously, symbolize the 
rational mind, and the jibbers are passions and emotions. The requirements of ra-
tionality are here straightforward: the rational man should always listen to the 
horsemen (rational commands), and tame the wild horses (passions). This ancient 
model of rationality is still prevalent in the western culture: the same message is 
conveyed in contemporary rational choice theory. In this model, the rational man 
is depicted as Ulysses, who repeats the gesture of the horseman and deafens him-
self to the call of the sirens.3 It is clear that in these traditional Olympian4 ideas, 
emotions are treated not only as irrational, but even detrimental and destructive. 
The second premise of personhood is the continuity of memory. The most famous 
answer to the difficult question of ‘What makes it that a person at one time is the 
same person at a different time?’, is that of John Locke. It is not the substance, not 
the bodily identity, but the continuity of memory, which gives us the sense of self, 
says the philosopher. Identity can be imagined as auto-narration – a total sum of 
sentences we can utter about ourselves on the basis of our history, our conscious-
ness and self-knowledge. From this, the traditional concept of autonomy follows: 
if rationality requires self-control, and identity is constituted by conscious auto-
narration, then autonomy cannot be understood as anything else than the ability 
to make individual, fully-informed and independent decisions.  
Rationality and memory are precisely the same capacities that are impaired 
by dementia. The process of impairment is, however, gradual, expands over time 
and is never fully predictable. Even in difficult cases, a sufferer can manifest sud-
den moments of awareness. The loss of cognitive functions cannot be thus treated 
in a binary, ‘zero or one’ way. The fact that a person’s consciousness can fluctuate 
or re-emerge requires development of attentive tools that help maintain the de-
mentia sufferers’ sense of self and self-expression as long as possible. This is 
a pragmatic reason why dementia requires loosening the narrow frames of Olym-
pic rationality and lowering the high ambitions of human consciousness. Another 
reason is philosophical: the fact that sufferers display better cognition in certain 
situations, for example, when surrounded by family and friends, or in the midst of 
                                                 
3 Elster [1998]. 
4 Simon [1982]. 
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artistic activities, is significant and thought-provoking. Is the hyper-rational model 
of human personhood correct? Are homines sapientes as thoughtful as they claim to 
be? What does dementia – this extraordinary state of body and mind, of increased 
dependency and intensified vulnerability – tell us about human nature?  
Dementia highlights two hitherto neglected dimensions of personhood: 
emotionality and embeddedness. Emotionality, beside cognitive capacity, empha-
sizes the importance of emotional expressions and treats them as vital elements of 
human personhood. A person touched by dementia may not be able to express 
many of their wishes in an intelligible and sophisticated way, but retains their 
sense of preference, which can be worked out by tracing their emotional responses 
to certain propositions. The author of the Dementia Report describes the case of 
a woman with advanced dementia – a care home resident who, despite retaining 
very little cognitive capacities, could still remember dance steps and derived im-
mense pleasure from dancing with her husband.5 Their monthly ‘dancing dates’ 
were the continuation of a lifetime habit and a way of preserving intimacy despite 
the illness. Emotions are not only an expression of satisfaction and an indication of 
preferences, as in the case of the dancing woman, but also a tool for preserving 
and enhancing cognitive capacities. As powerfully and beautifully depicted in 
a documentary entitled I remember better when I paint, creating a safe and emotion-
ally-friendly surrounding may enable a person with dementia to preserve her 
cognitive capacities and remind her of the facts which seemed already forgotten.  
This multiple function of emotions – as tools of life-satisfaction, preference 
indicators, and ‘cognition catalysers’ – is in accordance with the newest models of 
human rationality. Beginning from the works of Hebert Simon,6 the Olympic 
model of rationality is brought into question. The recent Noble-winning theory of 
bounded rationality highlights the closeness of the cognitive-emotional tangle, and 
exposes the deep rationality hidden in human emotional aspects. Daniel Kahne-
man and Amos Tversky describe human thinking as being composed of two 
modes: the first is fast, intuitive, and emotional, and operates quickly and auto-
matically with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control. The second 
mode is slower, more deliberative and more logical, and allocates attention to ef-
fortful mental activities. Of the two, it is the first one that gives us what we call 
intuition.7 This positive account of emotions, as involving deep but not always 
                                                 
5 Cf. NCoB [2009] p. 64. 
6 Simon [1982]. 
7 Cf. Kahneman [2011]. 
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realised cognitive judgements, is confirmed by contemporary psychology8 and is, 
apparently, not so foreign in philosophy either – as early as at the beginning of 
the 20th century, Max Scheler9 described emotions as a way of perceiving values 
and a tool for building a personal value hierarchy (as later proven by people with 
dementia communicating their preferences emotionally). These theories reinforce 
the thesis that the wishes of people with dementia should not be dismissed too 
quickly, just because of their difficulties expressing them. The deterioration of 
cognitive capacities usually takes a top-down route, that is, from the most sophis-
ticated and effortful mental cognitions to the most basic and intuitive ones. There-
fore, from the fact of the loss of one of the higher functions – the possibility of logi-
cal self-expression – a conclusion about the total loss of cognitive abilities should 
not be derived. In terms of the theory of bounded rationality, it may be said that 
despite losing some of the abilities of the slow-thinking mode, the dementia suf-
ferer still retains their fast-thinking capabilities, which are expressed in the ration-
ality of their emotions. The theory of bounded rationality helps to interpret the 
phenomenon of dementia, and dementia, in turn, with its sudden and emotionally 
valid cognitions, can also be treated as a precious contribution to this theory and 
further proof of the mysteries and the inexplicable nature of human personhood. 
The second trait of human personhood emphasized by dementia is its em-
beddedness. The notion of embeddedness expresses the fact that a person is not an 
isolated individual, but a zoon politikon deeply rooted in social relations, which 
altogether shape their way of thinking, personal choices and identity. Personal 
identity, thus, cannot be reduced to self-consciousness, ‘auto-narration’ and indi-
vidual choices, as it is also influenced by people with whom we live, the environ-
ments we engage in and the quality of the relationships we build. This social self is 
not only a border around our inner fortress but a vital part of it (how deep this 
entanglement is can be best illustrated by Wittgenstein’s lesson on the impossibil-
ity of private language; the fact that even our autonomous, logical thinking is me-
diated by our social nature and the ‘social gift’ of language highlights the interde-
pendency of our social and personal selves). This interdependency is clearly 
exposed by dementia sufferers: in numerous situations dementia patients tend to 
remember more and express their minds much easier if their relatives are around. 
The assistance of close relatives works like a safety net, which allows these vulner-
able people not only to express themselves, but also – through the presence of 
those who help constitute their identity – to maintain their sense of self for longer.  
                                                 
8 Cf. Frijda [1988]; Nussbaum [2003]. 
9 Scheler [1913]. 
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Expanding the notion of personhood entails expanding the concept of 
autonomy. The traditional concept of autonomy is negative: it defines autonomy 
as non-interference and the freedom to make independent decisions. The classic 
catalogue of patient rights, such as the right to information, the right to give or 
withhold consent to treatment and the right to privacy, is designed to promote this 
kind of autonomy. In the case of dementia, however, the notion of autonomy as 
‘non-interference’ is insufficient, as it can be interpreted as ‘the right to be left 
alone’. This would, instead of expanding human freedom and well-being, lead to 
neglect and further degeneration of the dementia sufferer. In the light of the inti-
mate influence of our friends and relatives on our social self and personal identity, 
involving them in the care of dementia sufferers (after first establishing their bona 
fide, of course) seems a reasonable thing to do. Such a step is proposed by the au-
thors of an NCoB report on dementia, who develop a richer account of autonomy 
which they describe as ‘relational’. Their ‘relational autonomy’ starts from similar 
premises: that the wider notion of personhood is anchored in the social world, and 
the conviction that autonomy should not only be protected from interference but 
also actively promoted. Not surprisingly, the key role in the process of promotion 
is played by those who can understand what a person with dementia experiences, 
wants and feels ‘without words’ – their family and friends, their surroundings, 
and all those people connected to this person by deep emotional bonds. 
2.2. The structural challenge 
The concepts of social personhood and relational autonomy emphasize the 
role played by the dementia sufferers’ surroundings in the process of their care, 
thereby introducing the second – structural – challenge that we are faced with in 
the case of dementia. Dementia transforms not only the traditional concept of the 
person and their relationship with the world, but consequently also the mutual 
relations between different kinds of carers.  
Given the progressive deterioration of cognitive capacities in dementia suf-
ferers, their needs change progressively. In the first stage of the process, a person 
might be capable of living on their own, with sporadic help from relatives and 
friends. In the second stage, they become more dependent on the help of others, 
such as close relatives or friends. In the third stage, they cannot do without spe-
cialized medical or palliative care. However, the borders between these different 
stages are blurred, which raises the necessity of cooperation between different care 
providers, the coordination and continuity of care. Unfortunately, this is precisely 
what the healthcare system lacks, and this is to the detriment of the most impor-
tant carers – the informal ones.  
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Informal care is usually provided by spouses, and also possibly adult chil-
dren, sons- and daughters-in-law, friends, neighbours etc., with an overrepresen-
tation of women (in Europe, around 76% of informal caregivers are female10). In-
formal family care remains the cornerstone of care for dependent elderly people 
all around the world, and rightly so, as it is provided spontaneously, for noble 
reasons. The main motivations for caregivers of dementia sufferers are love and 
affection, as reported by 57% of respondents in a 2012 WHO survey. A sense of 
duty was reported by 15%, and a personal sense of obligation by 13%. Only 3% of 
caregivers stated that they ‘had no other alternative than to care’.11 For many posi-
tively-motivated carers, providing care is a rewarding experience despite its hard-
ships, allowing them not only to maintain intimacy with the sufferer, but also giv-
ing them a sense of fulfilment, meaning in their life, and self-esteem.  
Despite the pivotal and undeniably beneficial role of this kind of care, in-
formal carers are neglected. This is grossly unjust, as they bear a double burden: 
firstly, they are personally affected by the suffering of the afflicted, and secondly 
they themselves experience emotional, social and financial strain from caring. 
Constant exposure to these stressors raises the probability of affective disorders 
amongst carers. Data suggests that 22.3% of carers had a depressive disorder dur-
ing the period of caring; 1 in 3 caregivers suffers from anxiety, and between half to 
three quarters of all caregivers experience the milder symptoms of depression and 
anxiety.12 What is particularly affectively dangerous about dementia is its progres-
sively degenerative nature, which can result in carers regarding their effort as 
Sisyphean, which increases the probability of developing affective disorders 
as dementia develops. Another negative impact is made by the economics of the 
situation. Intensive caring is a full-time job, which can become incompatible with 
a normal professional life and force the carer to reduce the number of paid work-
ing hours they can take, or even to quit their job, exposing them to the risk of pro-
longed unemployment or even poverty.13 
Unfortunately, despite the crucial nature of informal care for dementia 
sufferers, as well as its dangers, it is often underestimated by social and medical 
services. This underestimation consists not only in the neglect of carers’ own 
needs, their health and well-being, but also in the lack of trust from professionals 
who often choose not to share helpful information, discharging their assistance 
                                                 
10 WHO [2012] p. 69. 
11 Ibidem, p. 71. 
12 Ibidem, p. 73. 
13 Colombo et al. [2011] p. 91–97. 
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and general lack of coordination between different kinds of care. The neglect of 
carers is reprehensible, not only for practical and moral reasons, but also for the 
financial ones. The costs of dementia care are still growing, and the society does 
not cease to age. These factors cause the third challenge dementia exposes us to – 
the financial one.  
2.3. The financial challenge 
Here statistics speak for themselves. Dementia costs will be soon ranked as 
high as the world’s largest economy. For now, they range from 16th to 18th place, 
together with countries such as Indonesia, the Netherlands, and Turkey. In 2015 
the global societal economic cost of dementia was USD 818 billion, compared to 
USD 604 bn in 2010 (a 35% increase). This gigantic sum is more than the market 
values of companies such as Apple (USD 742 bn), and Google (USD 368 bn).14 
These costs are still increasing and will continue to do so as European society con-
tinues its rapid ageing: in 1950 only 1% of the global population was over 80; by 
2050 this figure is likely to increase to 4%, with nearly 10% of that being in OECD 
countries.15 This brief statistical presentation is enough to help us understand the 
scope of the impending financial catastrophe, which can, however, be prevented 
by adopting a more solidary dementia policy. 
3. Two models of solidarity: welfare-based and cooperative  
3.1. The paradox of solidarity 
At first glance, the statement that the global costs of dementia require 
a solidarity-based remedy may seem paradoxical.  
On the one hand, dementia demonstrates the increasing need for solidarity. 
If man is not a perfectly rational or fully autonomous, and thus not self-sufficient, 
creature, then the only conclusion can be an obligation to mutual assistance. This 
insufficiency does not only concern dementia sufferers, but is part of our general 
human condition: frailty and dependency are deeply rooted in our limited human 
nature, and are stimulated by dementia (to which everybody is prone, according 
to the epidemiological statistics), any other illness or different kind of predica-
ments. Blaise Pascal was right: regardless of how hard we try to hide our fragility, 
we are ‘hollow reeds, blowing in the wind’.  
On the other hand, the increasing need for solidarity is related to the grow-
ing costs of health care. The concept of solidarity in healthcare is traditionally de-
                                                 
14 Cf. Prince et al. [2015] p. 1. 
15 Colombo et al. [2011] p. 13. 
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fined as an obligation to ‘help the suffering, the troubled and the disadvantaged’16, 
which in the European welfare system is treated as a state obligation. Janos Kornai 
completes this definition as follows: ‘It has to be prescribed by law that the state 
must help the suffering, the troubled and the disadvantaged’17 and Ruud ter 
Meulen adds: ‘In the European welfare state, the basic understanding of solidarity 
is that everyone is assumed to make a fair financial contribution to a collectively-
organised insurance system that guarantees equal access to health and social care 
for all members of society.’18 This obligation is realized in a threefold way: as risk 
solidarity, establishing an allowance for people who, due to a congenital disease 
or disability incur higher risk and usually higher costs for healthcare insurers; 
as income solidarity, subsidizing the poorest; and as age solidarity, establishing an 
allowance for frail seniors who become frequent customers of healthcare. How-
ever, as the needs of ‘the needy’ are unending and the human and financial 
resources of healthcare very limited, uncritical solidarity would lead welfare ar-
rangements to a dead end. The already enormous and ever-increasing global costs 
of dementia clearly illustrate this mechanism.  
How, then, can the prevalence and growing costs of dementia appeal to 
greater financial expenditure? In view of the demographic reality, such an appeal 
seems irresponsible. So how to solve the contradiction between the increasing 
need for solidarity and its diminishing affordability? To answer this question 
properly, we have to take a closer look at the concept of solidarity itself. Among 
many different interpretations of this notion, the ‘welfare-based’ and ‘cooperative’ 
versions of solidarity are of the highets relevance in this context.  
3.2. Welfare-based solidarity  
The paradox of solidarity discussed above is caused by its having a dis-
torted model. Nowadays, solidarity is associated with the phenomenon of welfare-
based solidarity. This kind of solidarity postulates an ideology of state protection 
(‘solidarism’), rather than the free, spontaneous cooperation of citizens. It is based 
on three premises: the first is the above-mentioned ideal of helping the suffering, 
the troubled and the disadvantaged. This help, as Ruud ter Meulen postulates, 
thus formulating the second premise, should be organized as a common enterprise 
(such as a collectively-organised insurance system). The third premise ascribes the 
accomplishment of the obligations of solidarity to the state. The first two premises 
express the notion of solidarity itself, and the obligations following from it. The 
                                                 
16 Kornai, Eggleston [2001] p. 17. 
17 Ibidem, p. 18. 
18 ter Meulen [2015] p. 4. 
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third premise refers to its legal transcription – it places these obligations on the 
state and its ‘benevolent’ institutions that promote people’s welfare. 
Economic arguments against welfare-based solidarity are clear. The idea of 
state protection, equal, unlimited access to medical goods and special care for the 
most vulnerable is admittedly a noble and beautiful idea, but plainly unrealistic in 
a world marked by human finitude and limited resources. In the domain of medi-
cine, this shortage is particularly visible: the ageing of the European population is 
the reason for both the increase of its medical needs and decrease of its vitality, 
and thus financial potential. And after having described the financial dangers of 
dementia, one does not need to further demonstrate that this economic reality is 
the case. But what is more controversial about the welfare state is its apparent 
moral legitimation and public attachment to this idea, which causes populist out-
rage when the fundaments of welfare guarantees are questioned. However, the 
moral legitimation of the welfare state is not so obvious. 
The main moral arguments against this welfare-based model of solidarity 
are directed at the third premise. They question the ascription of the obligations of 
solidarity to the state and thus, indirectly, the idea of the welfare state itself. On ter 
Meulen’s19 account of solidarity, reference is made to the idea of decency, pro-
moted by Avishai Margalit. Margalit sets the social arrangements in the order of 
growing perfection, beginning from civilized society, through decent society, then 
just society, with the society of solidarity as the most advanced form of social de-
velopment. Decency, thus, is a precondition of solidarity, the realization of which 
cannot be accomplished when decency is infringed. The infringement of decency 
is ‘any behaviour or condition that constitutes a sound reason for a person to con-
sider his or her self-respect injured.’20 Margalit rightly observes that the welfare-
state institutions tend to humiliate citizens with their essential paternalism and 
humiliating procedures which are necessary in obtaining their due rights. As 
proved by empirical research, administrative benevolence results in three kinds of 
unfavourable consequences: 1) the growing costs of care as an extension of admin-
istrative benevolence is expensive; 2) the ‘crowding out’21 of private, spontaneous 
benevolence, private solidarity and, as with dementia, family care; 3) the ‘learned 
helplessness’22 of beneficiaries, whose capacity for free action is brought into ques-
tion by depersonalised and standardized institutional help. The difficulties of de-
                                                 
19 ter Meulen [2011].  
20 Margalith [1996] p. 9. 
21 Bohnet [2001]. 
22 Dixon [2012]. 
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mentia care, which fit into the welfare-based schema, are the best example. Home 
care, hospitals and other formal institutions are necessary, but not the most 
needed by dementia patients, who prefer to and can be successfully cared for by 
their family members. However, tax-based resources, rather than in facilitation 
and coordination of family care, are invested mainly in the extension of formal 
institutions, which are not only less efficient, but also have higher maintenance 
costs. This creates an illusion of solidarity: society proves its solidarity with ‘the 
needy’ by the extension of a formal system of care while family carers who display 
spontaneous solidarity with dementia sufferers are neglected or even crowded out 
by the state’s over-action. 
The critics of welfare-based solidarity cite not only the third premise of its 
organizational aspect and ascription of solidary obligations to the state, but also 
the content of the idea conveyed in the first two premises. Obviously, the philoso-
phical content of the idea defines the shape of its legal transcription. The first two 
premises present the idea of solidarity as the combination of cooperation (‘collec-
tively-organised insurance system’) and support (‘help the suffering, the troubled 
and disadvantaged’). Solidarity is understood here as a common enterprise of 
humanitarian help. As a symbol of association based on solidarity, such organiza-
tions as ‘Doctors Without Borders’ – an organisation providing voluntary humani-
tarian aid to the poorest and neediest – stand out. While it is undeniably true that 
the two elements of cooperation and support are essential to the bond of solidar-
ity, its aim cannot be reduced to humanitarian aid alone. In the helping relation-
ship, especially government-provided help, there is an inherent danger. Even in 
the case of generalized, institutional help, which is not directly provided out of 
pity or compassion, these legitimations often refer to such feelings indirectly. Ob-
viously, pity cannot be easily identified with compassion and the well-known 
acute Nietzschean criticisms of these feelings may seem too sharp and too far-
reaching in the case of humanitarian help. But still, it reveals the dangers of this 
asymmetry of power and status, which is one possibility inherent in the ‘master 
and servant’ relationship. The phenomenon of ‘learned helplessness’ confirms the 
possibility of this scenario. Another danger of compassion in politics is Parfit’s 
famous objection of levelling down23 – politics ruled by pity for les miserables often 
results in an ‘egalitarianism of envy’, which often results in worsening the situa-
tion of the most affluent and privileged.  
The main objection to the ‘humanitarian’ version of solidarity, which is 
written under welfare arrangements, are not its paradoxical causes. These are 
                                                 
23 Parfit [1997]. 
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rather a consequence of its distorted model which does not fully do justice to the 
nature of solidarity. The latter will be exposed with the example of a cooperative 
version of solidarity. 
3.3 Cooperative solidarity 
The elements of cooperation and mutual help are constituent parts of soli-
darity. This notion stems from Proto-Indo-European *solh₂idʰos, a suffixed form of 
the root *solh₂-  (‘integrate’, ‘whole’), with the Latin ‘solidus’, meaning 
‘firm, dense, compact, not hollow, solid’.24 It calls directly back to the ancient Roman 
legal institution of obligatio in solidum, which was the obligation undertaken by 
partners in a joint venture. This was an obligation of a special, radical nature, un-
der which each member of a business partnership was responsible for the entire 
debt. The radical nature of this obligation can be briefly but accurately expressed 
by the famous catchphrase of those noble friends, the three musketeers: ‘One for 
all, and all for one’. As in the friendship of those gallant knights, the obligatio in 
solidum requires special, gentle features of character and a deep, mutual trust – the 
decision to take on such a radical responsibility presupposes a special quality of 
relations between the partners of an enterprise. In relation to this original, etymo-
logical meaning, solidarity on a wider social scale is often described as being 
a ‘civic friendship’.25 The example of friendship, whether interpersonal, legal or 
social, displays the main features of solidarity. These are: 1) an attitude of coopera-
tion, often undertaken for a higher, ‘noble’ aim; 2) a bond of trust, which emerges 
in the course of spontaneous, value-based cooperation, and as a form of social 
capital fuels the cooperation itself, and 3) radical individual responsibility for the 
common enterprise, which is the responsibility for its gains, losses and debts. 
This radical responsibility ‘for good and for bad’ includes an obligation to 
mutual help in the case of emergency. At first glance, this model of solidarity adds 
nothing new to its humanitarian version – here, too, solidarity is composed of two 
elements: cooperation and mutual help. However, in the context of cooperative 
solidarity, this help has not a humanitarian, but a restorative character – it is not 
provided out of pity or compassion, but out of previously undertaken responsibil-
ity. As such it preserves the liberal, and thus liberating character; help provided 
out of freely undertaken responsibility has a different, less ‘addictive’ character 
than help provided out of emotional necessity or the lust for power. Its aim is also 
different, which is not only the relief, but the restoration of impaired cooperation. 
                                                 
24 http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0059:entry=solidus 
[15.9.2016]. 
25 Cf. Brunkhorst [2005]. 
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Hannah Arendt could be considered an intellectual patron of this kind of solidar-
ity. In her excellent book On revolution,26 she presents an original account of soli-
darity as a ‘common action’. In this account solidarity is a non-emotional alterna-
tive to relations based on pity or compassion. What unites people in common ac-
tion is not pity or other feelings, but perception of common values and interests. 
Among these interests the most important ones are freedom and human dignity. 
As such, solidarity is a revolutionary concept: not only does it strive for freedom 
(in the context of political revolution), but realizes it in the course of common 
action.  
3.4. Solidarity and reciprocity  
Both versions of solidarity lie very close to each other. In the previous sec-
tion, as an example of humanitarianism, solidarity was presented in the form of 
the charitable Médecins Sans Frontières organization, which offers benevolent help 
to the neediest and poorest inhabitants of the earth. Of the different kinds of coop-
erative solidarity, the prime example of the Polish trade union can be offered. 
Known in Latin as nomen omen, and to modern man as Solidarity, this was one of 
the most beautiful historic examples of civic friendship. Polish ‘Solidarity’ encom-
passed two previously-mentioned dimensions: it was a ‘revolutionary association’ 
fighting for freedom under totalitarian rule, and also a kind of cooperative, whose 
members offered each other mutual help in cases of dismissal from their jobs or 
persecution. The example of Polish ‘Solidarity’ illustrates well the liberating and 
restorative potential of mutual support. As many members of the legendary Polish 
trade union confirm,27 their mutual support worked as a safe ground that enabled 
them to speak their minds freely, in confrontation with the political (and profes-
sional, as they often coincided at that time) powers-that-be. Thanks to this ‘safety 
net’, they could hope that in the case of their dismissal, there would be someone to 
help them get back on their feet. Thus, instead of teaching helplessness, solidary 
assistance empowered and enhanced cooperation, proving the authenticity of civic 
friendship (‘solidarity in need is solidarity indeed’). 
This liberating power was enabled by the symmetrical character of the rela-
tionship between the members of this association. Originally, both its benefactors 
and beneficiaries were ‘civic friends’ – they had primarily equal positions and 
their trouble-driven asymmetry was of an accidental and temporal character. In 
the case of humanitarian help, the situation is essentially different. Here, the rela-
tionship is not only primarily asymmetrical, but constituted by this asymmetry: 
                                                 
26 Arendt [1963]. 
27 Cf. Krzemiński [2013]. 
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the affluence, the surplus of resources enables the benefactor to support the bene-
ficiary in need. In the case of the welfare-state (or different kinds of state aid), 
support for this asymmetrical distribution of power reaches an extreme, as here 
a vulnerable individual is confronted with the ‘omnipotent’ powers of the Hobbe-
sian Leviathan. However, even in the case of the most humbly and benevolently 
provided medical aid, this relational asymmetry is irreducible and can have an 
addictive character for its recipients. The members of a solidary association have 
the experience of partnership, they do not cease to be partners in a situation of dif-
ficulty and their mutual support is aimed at restoration of the original partnership, 
and this cannot be said about asymmetric humanitarian help. Obviously, it does 
not question the necessity of such benevolent support, but requires distinguishing 
from the relations of solidarity. This difference can be most clearly presented in 
the cited example of the Doctors Without Borders organisation. The notion of soli-
darity can be applied to it as far as the relations between the doctors engaged are 
concerned. The members of the organization who work together for the noblest of 
all noble causes – humanitarian aid – trust and assist each other, and in doing so 
display true solidarity. However, their asymmetric relationship with their patients 
is essentially different, and could be described as benevolence, mercy, compassion, 
or on a wider view which speaks of belonging to ‘the family of man’ – fraternity. 
Why is reciprocity so important? It is the basis of every true friendship and 
also of civic relationships. As Aristotle argued in his classic and beautiful theory of 
friendship,28 friendship requires a reciprocal exchange of goods: in a pure and true 
friendship, ‘like’ is paid with ‘like’; in a ‘friendship of interest’, favours are paid 
with favours, and in a friendship ‘for pleasure’, needs and desires are mutually 
satisfied. Although only the first kind of relation can be called ‘friendship’ in the 
full sense of this word, as it is based on a free choice of the person of a friend 
(similarly, solidarity as a form of civic friendship is most complete if based on 
a perception of common values and love for the common good, instead of interests 
or needs). Each of these relations is based on the reciprocal exchange of goods ‘in 
kind’. Violation of this balance must be compensated by paying back the debt with 
other kinds of goods. As Aristotle puts it, a person who likes more must pay their 
indifferent friend with additional admiration or favour. The same rule of reciproc-
ity also functions in a civic relationship, which must be based on isonomy – the 
correspondence of rights and obligations. In civic relations, the lack of this recip-
rocity also has a high price: the Hobbesian Leviathan sells safety for freedom, ex-
cessive class disproportions trigger social revolutions, and welfare-based solidar-
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ity teaches helplessness. On the other hand, as proven by contemporary research 
on social capital, civic friendships and trusting cooperation are the irreplaceable 
powers contributing to the wealth of nations to a great extent.  
The inherent reciprocity of family and friends’ relations also explains the 
success of informal dementia carers. As already proven by the sociological 
research, cited in the first part of the article, such care, despite its difficulties, 
is rewarding in itself, as it allows for the maintenance of intimacy with one’s suf-
fering loved ones, and in turn, being provided out of love and affection, it does not 
humiliate or disempower dementia sufferers. Naturally, this does not invalidate 
the necessity of also providing formal, professional care, but by emphasizing the 
advantages of spontaneous bottom-up solidarity it does show that this is a domain 
worth investing. The cooperative model of solidarity is not only cost-effective, but 
philosophically justified. It corresponds to the original meaning of solidarity and 
historical modes of its functioning, as well as to the vision of relational person-
hood presented in the first chapter of this essay. Cooperative solidarity empha-
sizes both sides of human nature: its relational aspect, the human necessity to 
be embedded in a larger entity, the ability to trust and cooperate, as well as our 
irreducible individuality, expressed in the radically individual nature of responsi-
bility.  
Despite all its assets, this model is most in need of legal transcription. As 
Durkheim rightly argued, observing in his epoch a transition from automatic to 
organic solidarity, the period of ‘paradigm shift’ is always marked by legal ‘ano-
mie’ – a state in which the old moral and legal norms do not function properly any 
longer, while the new ones are not yet fully developed. Although the cooperative 
model of solidarity is still in statu nascendi, we can discern its general features. 
Obviously, criticism of excessive state protection is not automatically a plea for 
a minimal state. The cooperative model of solidarity still needs to provide, as ter 
Meulen would put it, a ‘decent minimum of health care’. And as has already been 
argued, this requirement of decency is directed against institutional humiliation 
and excessive ‘solidarism’. Instead of extending formal care beyond measure, part 
of the resources could be transferred to building channels of cooperation, promot-
ing and facilitating bottom-up cooperation and mutual assistance, as well as ena-
bling private and public partnerships. Dementia, with its growing costs on the one 
hand, and its relatively deep embeddedness in informal structures of care on the 
other, is a testing ground for these new ideas, and the new, emerging model of 
supportive care proves its feasibility.  
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4. Solidarity in dementia care. The supportive care approach  
4.1. Cooperative solidarity in health care 
The concept of cooperative solidarity is slowly emerging in dementia care, 
and the NCoB’s recent Dementia Report can be seen as a proof of this process. Its 
authors use the concept of solidarity in the field of bioethics, medicine and health-
care in a creative way, thus proving that it is still a powerful and inspiring idea 
that can operate as an engine of change. They define it briefly as the conviction 
that ‘we are all “fellow-travellers” and that we have duties to support and help 
each other and in particular those who cannot readily support themselves’.29  
This definition can be completed by the one proposed in another NCoB re-
port, dedicated this time entirely to the concept of solidarity. Solidarity, it asserts, 
means shared practices reflecting a collective commitment to bear the ‘costs’ (fi-
nancial, social, emotional or otherwise) of assisting others, which follows from the 
recognition of sameness or similarity in at least one relevant respect.30 This defini-
tion clearly shows that the authors of both reports think about solidarity in a co-
operative way, as primarily a relation between symmetrical fellowship and collec-
tive commitment, following from some form of similarity or commonality (shared 
identity, common cause, common values) with the secondary obligation to bear 
the mutual costs. It is undeniably true that solidarity finds expression in emer-
gency situations, when we have to help one another and prove the authenticity of 
our collective commitment to carry mutual burdens (‘solidarity in need is solidar-
ity indeed’, as it has already been said). One such emergency is the challenging 
situation of dementia. However, even if people so affected are in a situation of de-
pendence, vulnerability and the aforementioned asymmetry, the authors of the 
report rightly emphasize their cooperative potential, writing that ‘those receiving 
care and support should not be seen simply as people with particular rights or as 
victims of a disease or disability, but rather as citizens with both their own needs 
and a societal role’. It is clear that this kind of solidarity should not be provided 
out of pity or mercy towards dementia sufferers, but from recognition of their still 
valid social role and the reciprocal contribution they can make.  
The authors of the Dementia Report propose a different model of solidarity 
in healthcare than that provided under its traditional welfare-based understand-
ing. Collective commitment to bear the costs is not exhausted by tax collection, 
through which administrative help and institutional benevolence are then fi-
nanced. Although institutional help is indispensable (especially in the last stage of 
                                                 
29 NCoB [2009] p. 29. 
30 Buyx, Prainsack [2011] p. 46–50. 
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dementia), reducing the content of solidarity to a formal arrangement would 
deepen the feeling of helplessness felt by people touched by dementia, as well as 
their relatives. This would result in their further exclusion from ‘normal’ social 
life, which for a long part of dementia’s development could be avoided. The au-
thors of the Dementia Report therefore propose a twofold model of cooperative 
solidarity, which corresponds to its general features, as described above. This 
model requires, firstly, the provision of a decent minimum of professional help for 
those who cannot readily help themselves, and then direct themselves for help to 
those who already do help in a spontaneous, benevolent and natural way, namely 
informal family carers. In this cooperative vision, it does not suffice for solidarity 
to establish institutions of formal care, but requires above all the building of chan-
nels of cooperation between the different care providers, including those who 
have become dependent and frail in their ‘normal’ social life as far as possible. 
The state, with its administrative powers, fulfils here only a subsidiary, coopera-
tive role.  
4.2. A supportive approach – the emergence of a new paradigm 
The first indication of this paradigm shift can be found in reference to the 
evolution of the model of care for dementia sufferers. Clarifying the image of de-
mentia has substantially contributed to its evolution. Julian C. Hughes accurately 
reconstructs this process.31 Because of the complex nature of dementia, which has 
biological, mental and social dimensions, the previously dominant biomedical and 
psychosocial care models appeared to be irreducibly unilateral. The biomedical 
model, which emphasized the illness, regarded dementia sufferers and their carers 
as patients and offered them strictly pharmacological treatments, played down the 
social aspect of dementia and disregarded the patient and his individual needs. 
The psychosocial model, on the other hand, stressed the importance of the indi-
vidual and their psychological and social life, and thus neglected the biological 
side of dementia.  
The first solution to this impasse of unilaterality was the palliative care 
movement. Its main advantage was a holistic approach encompassing the bio-
medical, psychosocial and spiritual, and concern for the psychological wellness of 
the family, especially during periods of bereavement. However, the main 
achievement of palliative care, the abolition of the dichotomy between cure and 
care, does not fully suit the nature of dementia. The palliative care approach stems 
from end-of-life contexts such as cancer care, where a cure is no longer possible. 
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But dementia is different: despite its progressive nature, many symptoms can be 
alleviated, and it is often curative actions which bring the best palliation. Going 
further, the supportive care approach utilises a framework that unifies all former 
aspects in a creative way. It draws on the holistic approach of the palliative model 
(in the sense that it should emphasize the quality of life and take into account 
spiritual needs) without resigning from pharmacological treatmet. The most im-
portant novum of the supportive care framework is that it adds to the previous 
models’ greater appreciation of the role of family. Family members are not taken 
into account exclusively during the period of bereavement, but are primarily 
treated as ‘partners in care’, worthy of support in their own support of the demen-
tia sufferer, and also as ‘subjects of care’ being in need of support themselves.  
4.3. Tools of solidarity: supportive care in practice  
Supporting family carers is a ‘win-win-win approach’32. First of all, it is 
highly favourable for the dementia sufferers, being the main subjects of supportive 
care. This is not only because people generally prefer to be taken care of by those 
who really care for them, out of love and affection. Care for their family carers also 
touches dementia sufferers personally. This conclusion follows from the expanded 
notion of personhood presented in the first part of this article. Within these ex-
panded frames, close social relations are treated as part of the self and a necessary 
condition for maintaining one’s identity. In order to keep the sense of the self of 
dementia sufferers and enable them to exercise ‘relational autonomy’, it is thus 
necessary to support the whole family and social structure that they are rooted in. 
Another ‘win’ in caring for carers is offered to the state. In light of the above-
presented statistics, it is clear that the only affordable strategy for managing 
the increasing threat of dementia epidemics is through informal carers. Finally, as 
the carers are often over-worked and brought to their emotional, physical and fi-
nancial limits, caring for them is our moral obligation, and as such a moral win.  
The Alzheimer’s Society33 postulates a series of actions to relieve carers, 
which can be classified into three general groups: actions designed to offer respite, 
counsel and emotional support to carers; actions aimed at including carers in for-
mal care processes (e.g. providing them with necessary information, advice and 
guidance, involving carers in decisions on care and support, coordinating their 
work with the work of medical staff), and finally, means of financial support. An-
other important kind of actions, not mentioned by the Alzheimer’s Society but af-
                                                 
32 Colombo et al. [2011] p. 121.  
33 Cf. https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/documents_info.php?documentID=546 
[15.9.2016].  
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fecting the wellbeing of carers in an essential way, are actions intended at combat-
ting the stigma attached to dementia and promoting the social inclusion of people 
touched by dementia and their relatives.  
a) Personal support  
The most important field of action is undeniably the first one. Offering car-
ers emotional counselling and physical respite not only gives them the possibility 
of restoring their strength, but is also the right way to recognize the significance of 
their work and show them due respect. This kind of support is provided in many 
forms, with respite care being the most common. The aim of respite care is to alle-
viate the burden of care by providing a temporary pause (varying from ‘day-
breaks’ to long-term breaks) from caring. This can be achieved through various 
means, such as day-care services, in-home respite and institutional respite.34 Al-
though the necessity of respite seems obvious and such help is easy to get without 
external help, arranging and offering respite care ‘institutionally’ is more impor-
tant than it seems. Many carers often hesitate to take such breaks because they are 
uncertain about the quality of care they will leave the person they are in charge of 
with, as well as the financial difficulties they often struggle with. Another impor-
tant action in this domain is counselling. This also has two dimensions: one aimed 
at the carer and their own emotional needs and problems, the other at the person 
they are taking care of. Offering a carer ‘professional training’ is also very impor-
tant, as they know the sufferer much better than medical and social staff, and can 
provide qualitatively better and more effective care, despite usually lacking pro-
fessional knowledge of the nature and process of dementia. Providing a carer with 
even the most basic information can spare them a lot of stress and feelings of help-
lessness and defeat that they often experience due to their lack of knowledge. Such 
emotional counselling and ‘professional training’ is offered by private non-profit 
organisations (such as various national Alzheimer’s societies), or sometimes sim-
ply by other more experienced dementia carers. Unfortunately, many carers are 
not aware of the services available to them. This highlights the need to improve 
information and coordination services.  
b) The coordination of care  
The adherents of the ‘supportive care approach’ unanimously emphasize 
that it can be achieved in small logistical steps, the first of which is coordination of 
different services.35 They propose the introduction of a care-manager, or care-
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coordinator, who would provide continuity and advice on all avenues of care, es-
pecially in the period of transition from a milder to a more sever stage of demen-
tia. This type of ‘key-worker’ has already been introduced in different countries. 
England has an institution of specialized ‘admiral nurses’ who visit carers and 
dementia sufferers in their own homes to deliver education, training and support. 
The Dutch system, which has undergone a transition from ‘nursing home medi-
cine’ to general and less institution-focused ‘elderly medicine’, also operates simi-
lar coordinative services.36 Germany has Social Services Centres which evaluate 
carers’ needs, inform and support them throughout the caregiving process and 
coordinate their work with the work of medical and social services. A parallel 
function is performed by the Vienna Health and Social Care Centres and Tyrolean 
Integrated Social and Healthcare, in Austria.37  
Of all these different solutions there is always one that seems to suit every 
healthcare system. In most cases, primary care physicians are ideally suited to the 
role of ‘care-coordinator’. They have most of the knowledge about a dementia suf-
ferer and his/her family, and should also be best informed about the possibility of 
community support networks and private care arrangements. Finally, they are 
able to recognize changes in the clinical condition of the person and her actual 
needs and direct her to appropriate specialist or institution. Therefore, instead of 
being a gate-keeper who restricts access to care – which, as the analysis by Con-
sumer House proves, is not necessarily as cost-saving as it is often said to be38 – 
the GP should instead be open to the possibilities of better, more integrated, and 
efficient care and serve as a liaison between different services.  
Gillie E. Evans and Louise Robinson39 propose a supportive care model 
based within primary care, in which the GP would be responsible for a patient 
throughout the entire course of their illness, from diagnosis to death. The role of 
the GP in the preliminary state of the illness (before and just after diagnosis) is in-
valuable. It can shorten the path from the initial revealing of suspicious symptoms 
to confirmation of a diagnosis, which may be crucial for the good preparation of 
future care, making important decisions and arrangements, leading conversations 
with relatives and friends, and preparing advance care statements and other 
documents if a national legal system allows it. Another important moment which 
should be taken care of is the moment of the confirmation of a diagnosis. Saying 
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38 Björnberg [2015]. 
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‘the D word’ openly, as Evans and Robinson eloquently name it, can have far-
reaching repercussions for the entire future process of coping with the condition. 
As the patient’s dementia develops, the GP’s tasks will change too. In later stages, 
the role will become one of a coordinator’s, rather than a counsellor’s, with more 
management and integration of different kinds of care than administering it him-
self. It can still, however, be life-saving in emergency situations, when every min-
ute counts and the right decisions need to be made quickly. Finally, the GP can 
adopt a proactive attitude and motivate all of the different carers, from relatives to 
specialists, to contribute to the improvement of the level of care provided, and en-
ter into further mutual cooperation.  
c) Maintaining trust  
Work with carers should encompass protection of their personal relation-
ship with the people they care for. This relationship is based on trust, and this 
trust should be maintained and expanded. Maintaining a trustful relationship is 
not only a sign of respect for the carer, but another necessary condition for pro-
moting the relational autonomy of the dementia sufferer. To protect this relation-
ship, the authors of the Dementia Report formulate an ethical imperative for pro-
fessionals to start from a presumption of trust in the carer, their bona fide, and 
in their knowledge of the dementia sufferer, which should last unless there is evi-
dence to the contrary.40 This presumption should have a legal consequence in an 
obligation to disclose confidential information on the medical condition to the in-
formal carers of a dementia sufferer lacking legal capacity, when it is in the suf-
ferer’s best interest. However, loosening the restrictions on such disclosures 
requires, in many legal documents, the guidance of medical professionals on the 
nature of the information the carers may need, and the reasons for disclosing it. 
(The possibility of abuse on carers’ part cannot be excluded.) Above all, it requires 
creating a ‘care partnership’ and building dialogue between all the parties con-
cerned.  
d) Financial support and social inclusion  
Another way to recognize and respect the work of carers is by providing fi-
nancial support to them. This is also a policy originally proposed by the Alz-
heimer Society. They argue that despite the fact that carers create huge savings for 
the national economy (in the UK, this is an estimated 11 billion GBP every year, 
just from the Alzheimer’s Society41), they often run into financial difficulties them-
                                                 
40 NCoB [2009] p. 120–122.  
41 Cf. https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/statistics [15.9.2016]. 
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selves. Therefore, financial support is often regarded as an expression of concern 
and solidarity. There are two basic forms of financial support. The first are finan-
cial allowances paid directly to carers. These are also divided into two basic forms: 
in the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden), family carers 
are remunerated in the form of a standard salary, as they are formally employed 
by long-term care institutions, whereas in English-speaking countries (Australia, 
Ireland, New Zealand, and United Kingdom), allowances are ‘means-tested’, and 
as such reserved only for carers ‘in financial need’.42 The authors of an OECD re-
port rightly observe that, in practice, both forms of allowances can potentially be 
abusive. They have many eligibility requirements for the carer, the level of care 
provided and the relationship between the carer and the recipient of care, which 
may be very difficult to assess administratively, could be perceived by carers 
as arbitrary, and in consequence lead to injustice (e.g. by remunerating only one of 
many family carers). The second form of financial support is indirect. This time, 
it is the recipient of care who receives a cash benefit instead of equivalent services 
in kind (e.g. personal budgets in Germany and the Netherlands), with which they 
can ‘hire’ their family carers formally, and pay them for care which they rate as 
better, more efficient and trustworthy than that provided by an external nurse, etc. 
This can, however, lead to the financial dependence of the carer, trapping them in 
a low-paid and low-skilled job, discouraging them from raising their qualifications 
and getting a better-paid job. Creating financial dependence in the carer can also 
deepen their emotional and physical entanglement and increase their likelihood of 
developing a serious illness. The most important threat is, however, the potential 
monetization of family relations. Usually, informal care is provided for emotional 
reasons (love, affection, trust, gratitude) or for noble reasons (a sense of obligation, 
stewardship), which are rewarding in themselves and constitute the uniqueness 
and intrinsic value of informal care. Introducing financial arrangements into rela-
tions based on trust and affection can crowd out these virtues. Providing financial 
incentives can also attract groups of carers acting with ‘bad motives’ and under-
mine the existing intrinsic ‘good motives’. Still, in many situations, providing fam-
ily carers with financial support seems unavoidable.  
A much better way to support a family carer financially is to help the carer 
reconcile their work and care (e.g. through flexible work arrangements or by 
granting them leave from work). Combining professional work with home care 
can be a challenge, both for the carer and the employer, but the benefits it can 
bring are invaluable. Professional work, apart from protecting financial security, 
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can paradoxically offer respite to a carer, allowing them to focus on something else 
than a loved one’s illness and raise their feeling of self-efficiency – crucial in the 
struggle with the non-conquerable illness that dementia is. This strategy is also 
much more solidary in the sense of the above-presented cooperative understand-
ing of solidarity. Although giving money may be perceived as a better and more 
solidary solution than multiplying formal institutions, it still operates within the 
paradigm of ‘humanitarian solidarity’. Cooperative solidarity not only obliges us 
to reinforce private cooperation and spontaneous initiatives, but also to do so in 
a cooperative way. Widening our social horizons enough to encompass dementia 
sufferers and their carers is a more challenging and much more solidary way of 
working than treating them as an ‘underclass’. Working with carers and creating 
possibilities for them to participate and contribute in a ‘normal’ social life requires 
a lot of education and effort on the part of administrative help, employers, co-
workers and society in general. This could be an important asset in the struggle 
with the social stigma attached to the dementia sufferers and their often over-
loaded and tired carers, which results in their social exclusion and solitude: bur-
dens often much harder to bear than the illness itself.  
5. Conclusions: ‘solidary transformation’  
Dementia is a challenge. It crudely exposes places where healthcare and so-
cial care need improvement. Healthcare is too exclusive and confined, focused on 
its own actions and achievements and reluctant to cooperate with social and in-
formal care. Healthcare professionals are, respectively, too narrow-minded and 
distrustful, operating in a ‘gate-keeping’ instead of ‘horizons-widening’ way. The 
horizons which really need to be opened encompass not only the way in which 
healthcare operates, but also the traditional view of healthcare, the understanding 
of dementia as a heath condition itself, and, last but not least, the concepts of 
human personhood and autonomy. Dementia – as every challenging situation – 
provokes a paradigm shift in these domains, and can be regarded as a ‘fortunate 
crisis’ that has already forced us to think about and seek new ways of expressing 
rationality and freedom (e.g. ‘relational personhood and autonomy’), as well 
as other ways of using human and financial resources (e.g. the ‘supportive care 
approach’) and it can be hoped that this development will continue successively.  
Solidarity is a challenge as well. The authors of the Dementia Report43 gar-
nish their reflections of solidarity with a quote from Charles Dickens’ Christmas 
Carol:  
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[…] when men and women seem by one concept to open their shut-up hearts 
freely, and to think of people below them as if they really where fellow-passengers 
to the grave, and not another race of creatures bound on other journey.44  
This short quote highlights the demands of solidarity. Solidarity is not only 
an obligation to help the poor, the sick and the needy, who are treated as ‘another 
[dependent] race of creatures’, but above all an invitation to open our own hori-
zons wide enough to see fellow travellers and friends in other human beings who 
are often frail and weaker than we are. This, however, requires acceptance of our 
own vulnerability and finite human condition. Exercising cooperative solidarity is 
thus much more challenging than exercising welfare-based solidarity, as it re-
quires not only the provision of external help, but also transformation of the way 
we see our beneficiaries, as well as the view of ourselves as benefactors. But it is 
also more rewarding, as it invites us to fellowship with others, and the joy of trust 
and cooperation are invaluable rewards of this ‘solidary transformation’.  
Healthcare is the testing ground for cooperative solidarity, as well as its 
promised land. This is not only because of the founding role solidarity plays in 
healthcare, medicine and bioethics, but also due to the fact that in this domain, 
social institutions interfere with the everyday life and health of citizens to the 
greatest extent, and their shape and way of functioning is of primary importance 
to every citizen (in this sense, healthcare is a critical point of contact for the private 
and public spheres). Advancement of solidarity in this domain will not only im-
prove our health and well-being, but can also become a cornerstone in building 
a more solidary and trust-based society. 
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